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2Global Cities, International Relations and the Fabrication of the World
Abstract
The global city presents one available model for understanding urbanization and associated
hierarchies of power. In International Relations, the global city is treated as a unit in a new
type of international system, an increasingly important actor in world politics, or a site
through which global processes operate. This article forwards an alternative perspective. It
treats the global city as a dispositif of power. While the global city captures the fact that
power and wealth are spatially concentrated in today’s urbanizing world politics, the concept
also has a world-making capacity. The article analyses this capacity in two contexts: Firstly, it
presents a genealogy of the voyage of the global cities concept from critical academic
scholarship to a buzzword of city elites and business consultants. Secondly, it performs a
governmental analysis of global city reports and indexes. Finally, the article suggests that
conceptualizing the global city as a dispositif enables the important task of imagining
alternative ways of framing the meaning of urbanization in world politics.
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3Introduction
The rapidly accelerating urbanization transforms the existing geographies of power and poses
major challenges for the discipline of International Relations. Urbanization consists of a set of
spatially grounded economic, demographic, technological and sociocultural processes, an
outcome of which is the emergence of a network of spatially concentrated infrastructural
configurations and human settlements. Keller Easterling suggests in her book Extrastatecraft
that “some of the most radical changes to the globalizing world are being written, not in the
language of law and diplomacy, but rather in the spatial information of infrastructure,
architecture and urbanism”.1 It is time for International Relations to start paying more
attention to cities and urban dynamics. An engagement with global cities literature presents
one way of doing this.
It has been argued that International Relations (IR) would have much to learn from the way in
which the global city concept has been treated in sociology and geography, and that IR would
have much to offer to discussions on global cities, notably on the political implications of the
growing importance of cities.2 Thus far, IR inquiries into global cities have mostly assumed
that the rise in the global city talk signals either a significant change in the structural logic of
the modern international structure or system, or the emergence of a new important political
actor. This article contributes to this discussion by suggesting an additional perspective from
which the dynamics of urbanization and the role of global cities in world politics and
international relations can be examined. I suggest that the Foucauldian notion of dispositif
offers a fruitful way of conceptualizing global cities in IR.
The conceptualization of the global city as a dispositif highlights that in addition to being an
imago mundi – a term that stands for the centralization of world economy’s command and
4control functions in a handful of major cities – the global city also functions as a fabrica
mundi. The argument does not claim that the various phenomena described by global city
scholars have not taken place or that the global city is a fictional entity. The notion of global
cities captures the inescapable fact that power and wealth are spatially concentrated in today’s
urbanizing world politics. However, the notion also has a prescriptive, world-making capacity
that current scholarship often misses. In addition to being a label for cities that possess
network power, the global city is also a mechanism of power and as such, it plays a role in the
fabrication of the world.3
In this article, I focus on the practices through which the global city has evolved from a
descriptive to a prescriptive notion. Despite the criticism levied against the concept within the
institutions of academic knowledge production,4 it has had powerful discursive effect in
academic and policy circles. “To be a global city”, the management consultancy firm A.T.
Kearney states in one of its reports, “is a splendid thing”.5 While Jennifer Robinson argues
that global city theorization has developed into a form of “authoritative knowledge” playing a
specific role within public discussion as a “regulating fiction”,6 Neil Brenner and Roger Keil
claim that behind this there is a “mistaken identification of the colloquial notion of the
global/world city with the scholarly concept developed in the [world/global city] literatures”.7
By contrast, I argue that the journey of the global city concept from a neo-Marxist concept to
an idée fixe of city elites is not a misunderstanding that needs to be cleared up. Rather, it is
something worth analyzing. A productive way to perform such an analysis is to approach the
global city as a dispositif and to explore its genealogical and governmental dimensions.
I make the argument in four parts. In the first section of the paper, I describe the ways in
which contemporary IR scholarship has responded to the “rise” of global cities. In the second
section, I elaborate the idea of the global city as a dispositif. I then substantiate these claims
with a brief genealogy of how the global city has evolved from an academic construct into a
5buzzword, and how this has entailed the selective appropriation of academic global cities
literature. The fourth part of my argument shows how the global city functions as a dispositif
and governmental mechanism: I focus on a particular element of the global city imaginary – a
set of influential global city reports and indexes. It is worth mentioning that while the focus
here is on the reports and indexes, there are similar governmental and disciplinary
mechanisms at play in various forums where global city formation is discussed.
Reception of the Global Cities Scholarship in International Relations
Over the past few years, IR scholars have started to argue that there is a need to develop
ontological and epistemological bases to understand the role of global cities in world politics
and international relations. Efforts to introduce global cities scholarship to IR audiences can
be divided into roughly three main strands: The first strand argues that IR scholars should
devote more attention to the rise of global cities as their emergence signals a transformation in
the international system, which destabilizes many of the key assumptions of the discipline.
The second suggests that the ascendance of a handful of cities to the position of global cities
should prompt IR scholars to widen the basis for theorizing the role of sub-national actors in
international relations and world politics. The third draws inspiration from relational spatial
theorizing, assemblage thinking and the associated idea of multi-scalar politics.
The strand that focuses on global cities as actors in world politics claims that cities are taking
on new roles within international relations and world politics.8 Acuto portrays cities as the
“invisible gorillas of international studies”.9 Ljungkvist is interested in the ways in which
cities and their local governments “act autonomously” or “make claims to political
authority”.10 These contributions argue that the agency of cities within diplomatic and
governance processes should be better recognized. This is said to result from the growing
trend of urbanization, but in particular from the fact that a handful of cities, because of their
6unique generative properties, are capable of wielding forms of network power.11 The
foregrounding of global cities as agents is often presented as a corrective to the IR discipline’s
“embedded statism” and the excessive presence of nation-states and inter-governmental
relations in international relations.12 The statism of the discipline is a problem due to the
growing importance of cities in diplomatic affairs and international relations:
Thanks to this location at the crossroads of manifold worldwide processes, they
are playing an essential role in the development of new governmental
rationalities by adding to the complexity of the global landscape of political,
economic, and cultural interactions and connecting micro (or local) political
processes with macro (or global) trends and relations.13
There are efforts within this strand of theorisation to move beyond the act of merely
highlighting the agency of the cities. This often means the examination of the cities’ influence
within wider structures of governance.14 Here, the status of a global city implies the capacity
of a city to position itself in a strategic position within urban networks and to produce
structures in the realms of global governance.15 Global cities are not only powerful but also
provide public goods and facilitate private goods; they impact the global environment;
organize and regulate worldwide, regional and national flows; possess capabilities for
strategic governance and can also entertain representative and advocacy relations with other
international entities.16 Alternatively, global cities can be conceptualized as cities that are
“capable of constituting and organizing [urban] networks”.17
This approach to global cities relies on a conception of power as a measurable phenomenon
that determines the capacity of actors to realize their will. Arguably, the claim that cities are
replacing states as key actors in international relations is underpinned by a somewhat
reductionist understanding of agency. As Peter Marcuse reminds us, there is something
7“perverse”18 to the practice of treating cities as actors. To discuss cities as actors – as entities
that pursue policies, position themselves in strategic roles, or join transnational climate
change networks, or cooperate or compete with each other – is to use a figure of speech.19 It
obscures the fact that specific groups act in the name of a city. In this article, I show that the
global city dispositif normalizes the idea of cities as unified actors pursuing policies and
engaging in competition with other cities. Therefore, this is something that IR scholars should
decode. Treating cities as actors implies a unity of purpose and a harmony of interests, which
is usually lacking, and thus “obfuscates the conflicts, the clashes of interest, the disparate and
diverse groups and viewpoints that characterize most urban communities”.20
When examined from the perspective of international systems, however, the emergence of
global cities as concentrations of wealth and power is argued to signal the re-emergence of
system diversity. If the international system is understood as a “set of interacting units
organised by a structure”,21 global cities can be thought to represent a new type of a unit. In
this perspective, the rise of global cities indicates the decline of the modern state as the
dominant organising principle of the international system. Simon Curtis emphasizes that when
viewed from the perspective of the longue durée, the state-centric version of the international
system with its structurally and functionally similar units appears a unique and short-run
historical moment.22 If we accept the claim that global cities are a “qualitatively new urban
form”,23 that they signal the emergence of a new “spatial code”24 and that we are, perhaps,
living through an important moment of international change,25 then we also need an
explanation for and analysis of how such a transformation takes place. My argument is that
examining the global city as a dispositif and detailing the ways in which it functions as a
prescriptive, world-fabricating notion enables exactly this.
Recently, IR scholars have also tried to fit global cities into the framework of relational
spatial theorizing. Acuto, for example, suggests that it would be productive to examine the
8power and influence of global cities in world politics as a relational effect of their
embeddedness in a multiplicity of power arrangements: “What agency [global cities] have is
an emergent effect of their positioning in the geography of world politics”.26 This implies the
examination of the political space of the global system as a process, as a “set of political,
economic and social structures in the making”.27 Curtis, in his discussion of the role of agency
in systems transformation, links the weakening of the modern state and the rise of other units
to the “neo-liberal project” and its strategicities.  Thus, “the global city … fulfils the
requirement for command and control nodes within a decentralised global economy, but also
brings with its emergence a site and space containing new potentialities for political and
social transformation”.28
Curtis has also cautioned that the global cities literature may replicate an essentialist view of
units and agency, or commit the error of methodological structuralism. He convincingly
argues that we need a processual conceptualization of global cities – a conceptualization,
which does not reify units but focuses on processes, social transactions and relations during
which certain units historically solidify. Curtis suggests that global cities should not be
examined from the point of view of subjective notions of agency, but rather they should be
treated as instantiations of a multiplicity of processes of becoming.29 Furthermore, he brings
in the literature on assemblages to his inquiry into global cities: “Global cities are the local
sites through which many of the processes that construct global space operate, and through
which transterritorial capabilities are produced”.30 In a similar vein, Acuto has suggested
“understanding the global city as an assemblage of multiple registers of authority, complexity
and globality”.31
Relational spatial theories, asssemblages and dispositif analyses are all attempts to think about
heterogeneous arrangements, and thus avoid assumptions of fixity and boundedness. They
yield a multi-scalar image of political processes, which replaces the idea that social and
9political life can be made sense of along levels-of-analysis.32 However, there are also
differences between assemblage and dispositif thinking. Paul Rabinow suggests that
temporality is one among these. While assemblages are an “experimental matrix of
heterogeneous materials”, dispositifs are relatively stable, and yet have shown adaptability to
various social purposes.33 Examining the global city as a dispositif highlights how its world-
making capacity – a capacity to fabricate the world in its own image – is an outcome of the
selective appropriation of stabilized elements for hegemonic social purposes. The following
section details this argument.
The Global City as Dispositif
Approaching the global city as a dispositif offers an alternative to the existing IR analyses of
global cities. There are commonalities – in particular with the assemblage approach – but also
significant differences. While the approaches discussed above define the global city as an
actor, site or unit within a system, here it is defined as a specific kind of apparatus of power
consisting of various kinds of elements – discursive as well as material. In Michel Foucault’s
definition, a dispositif consists of “discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory
decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and
philanthropic positions”.34 The point is to highlight that the study of discourses is not
sufficient for an analysis of power relations. What needs to be examined is the intersection of
discourses with various heterogeneous elements.35
A dispositif can be mediated by a variety of substitutable agents who evaluate and discipline
others, as well as themselves, with reference to it.36 Interestingly, individual agents may also
play substitutable roles within a dispositif. For example, while Saskia Sassen’s and Peter
Taylor’s global city theorization can be characterized as a neo-Marxist criticism of the
concentration of command and control functions into global cities,37 as a scientific advisors
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and contributors, they have also been important players in the production and legitimation of
consultant companies’ global city reports, which treat global citydom as a desirable status.38
As a dispositif emerges through the actions of a multitude of agents – such as academic
scholars or consultants – it is multivocal and often incoherent. Although its various elements
do not always operate in concert, there is a system of relations between the various
elements.39 Further, this system coheres just enough to become identifiable as a project and
achieve its overall effects.40
Secondly, a dispositif – such as that of the global city – circulates globally. The word global is
here understood to refer to an element with “a distinctive capacity for decontextualization and
recontextualization, abstractability and movement, across diverse social and cultural
situations and spheres of life”.41 It is not an all-encompassing universal. In this article, the
global city dispositif’s capacity for recontextualization is illustrated with a brief genealogy
that traces the voyage of the global city concept from a neo-Marxist notion to a consultancy
buzzword. This involves paying attention to the fact that while reports and indices designed in
locations such as London, Brisbane or Tokyo give positivity to the term global city, the notion
may be reconfigured selectively, as it is deployed in diverse political projects and social
norms at various locations.
Thirdly, the dispositif is strategic: in a given historical moment, its heterogeneous elements
are organized so as to meet “an urgent need”42 and normalize specific kinds of social relations
and subjectivities. Foucault’s example here is the assimilation of a floating population, which
was becoming burdensome for a mercantilist economy.43 An analysis should thus attempt to
recognise the strategic imperative of a dispositif and the types of social relations that it strives
to normalize.44 However, a dispositif is not determined: Its elements can re-arrange
themselves to provide answers to unexpected questions. The voyage of the global city concept
from critical geography to the network of consultants and urban elites illustrates exactly this.
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But conceptualising the global city as a dispositif is fruitful also because it also enables the
identification of cracks in the dispositif and shows how it could be directed toward alternative
sociospatial imaginations.
A fourth feature of the dispositif concerns the sense in which it constitutes a form of power
that Foucault elsewhere discusses as governmentality.45 Governmentality is a broad notion. It
draws attention to the general idea that power is not only repressive but also productive, as
well as to the wide variety of control techniques and forms of knowledge that inform and
shape the practices of governing. For the latter task, the analytics of governmentality offers a
toolbox – a set of conceptual distinctions – to understand the workings of power as a practical
activity that can be detailed at the level of the techniques, mechanisms and subjectivities.46 In
the empirical section of this article, I detail some governmental techniques that have bestowed
the global city its prescriptive, world-making capacity.
From an Analytical Construct to a Buzzword
This section presents a brief genealogy of the global city. Employing a genealogical
perspective enables the examination of beliefs and truth-claims in their historical context.47
As I take global city scholarship to be part of the dispositif, it is my task here to trace the
voyage of the global city as a concept from an academic construct to a buzzword and a
governmental mechanism. How did it come about that the notion of a global city, which was
originally an analytical notion developed to pose questions about urbanization processes
across the globe, is now commonly understood as status to which cities should aspire? How
has the global city developed into an authoritative image of city success?
Firstly, I argue that the concept of polarization, which was a central element in the world and
global cities literature, has become less pronounced – if not completely silenced – in the
popularized versions of the global city. This “forgetting” has been a significant element in the
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evolution of the concept into an image of city success. Secondly, I draw attention to another
kind of selective appropriation of the global cities literature. For example, the idea of inter-
city relations as competitive – as opposed to cooperative – has been treated critically in
academic literature. Yet, the popularized versions continue to draw heavily on the idea of
competitive angst between the cities of the world – presumably for the reason that it enhances
the concept’s governmental capacity and aspirational appeal.
The notion of the world/global city goes back to the first couple of decades of the 20th century
and the Chicago School sociologists who focused on cities as a unique social milieu. Writing
in 1938, Louis Wirth argued that “urbanization of the world”48 is one of the most  impressive
features of modern life. He suggested that cities should be understood as “the initiating and
controlling center of economic, political, and cultural life” and that these centres are unique
for the reason that they are not only material or administrative structures but “draw the most
remote parts of the world into [their] orbit.”49 A landmark text entitled The World Cities by
Peter Hall was published in 1966. It defines certain cities as centres of mobility, political
power, culture and talent.50 In it – as well as in other founding works of the world cities
literature – the world city is conceptualized as a status, which stems from the possession of
certain internal attributes. The term was firmly attached to the modern national imaginary:
world cities were understood to be the centres of the world’s most important nations.51
In the 1980s, the world cities research programme started to focus on macrosociological or -
geographical changes behind the central status of a handful of cities (such as Tokyo, Paris,
and New York). The focus of these mostly neo-Marxist analyses shifted from the internal
attributes of a certain set of cities to the new division of labour and its spatial organization.
The world-scale prominence of a limited number of cities began to be examined in the context
of power hierarchies created by capitalism, such as unequal exchange and core-periphery
dynamics. Unlike previously, world cities or global cities were not conceptualized as centres
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of significant nation-states but as central places in the global division of labour and dynamics
of capital accumulation.
An influential outcome of these discussions was John Friedman’s world city hypothesis.
According to it, world cities are the locations which global capital uses as “basing points in
the spatial organization and articulation of production”.52 Friedman’s world city hypothesis is
an attempt to systematize the study of world cities through an inquiry into how cities can be
arranged in a hierarchical order based on their position in the spatialization of the world
economy. The more indispensable a city was considered to be for the operations of global
capital, the higher it was placed in the dynamic hierarchy. Friedman’s vision of world politics
introduced the idea of organizing world cities into a hierarchy and suggested that a
“competitive angst” prompts cities to compete to “capture ever more command and control
functions”.53 Both of these principles have received critical treatment in recent research
literature on global cities.54 However, from the point of view of a dispositif analysis it is worth
recognizing that the global city reports, indexes, as well as media discussions generally,
continue to appeal to the competitive assumption in their discussion of global cities.
The term global city was made famous by Saskia Sassen in a similarly entitled landmark
work, originally published in 1991 and dedicated to a double dynamism in the spatial
organization of global capitalism. In Sassen’s analysis, global cities form part of the
infrastructure for economic globalization. At the same time as economic activity was
becoming more dispersed around the world, its “command and control functions” seemed to
concentrate in a handful of locations – in global cities.55 Sassen argues that the materialization
of the global economy in global cities is a function of the rise of the multinational
corporation, changes in the international division of labour, and technological advances. Over
the past few decades, these developments have led to the unbundling of modern territoriality
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and the rescaling of national territorial systems. Therefore, she conceptualizes global cities as
a functional by-product of the structural transformations of capitalism.
It is important to recognize that for Sassen – as well as for most scholars representing this
research tradition – the global city is a critical concept.56 It stands for economic growth and
rising salaries, but also for social polarization, segregation, shrinking middle classes, slum
production, gated communities, and so on. The structure of employment and the labour
market of cities where control-and-command functions of global capitalism concentrate has
some characteristic features. Firstly, in comparison to manufacturing, the service sector is
polarized with a larger number of highly paid workers at the top. Secondly, the high-wage
groups of global cities create a demand for low-wage service labour. Thirdly, Sassen argues
that the manufacturing sector of global cities not only declines but also downgrades, which
further polarizes the earnings between the high pay and low pay groups of global cities.57
The genealogy of the global city concept shows that the idea of hierarchical and competitive
city relations forms part of the original, neo-Marxist global city scholarship. So does the idea
that behind this hierarchy there is a model of wealth creation, which tends to rewards a
minority of citizens to the detriment of others.58 Yet, this is not a situation that the global city
scholars are happy to note. By contrast, the “purpose of the identification of a hierarchy of
world cities in the world economy with regard to the function of command and control by
neo-Marxist authors … is to identify and critique the concentration of power and wealth in
and across those cities”.59
Thus, being a global city may not be such a “splendid thing” as one can be led to believe. Yet,
the aspirational ethos, which now seems to form an inseparable part of the concept, has
effectively overshadowed the concern of the original global city literature over the uneven
concentration of wealth and power across cities,60 and over the fact that the dynamism and
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prosperity associated with global cities also creates “black holes” of poverty and
disconnection.61 This is not a matter of a mistaken identification between the colloquial and
scholarly global city concepts, but of selective appropriation. The global city concept has
been adapted to the agendas of “territorial competitiveness”, “entrepreneurial cities” and
“competition states”. Some elements – such as the assumption of competitive angst – have
been retained, while other elements have been strategically forgotten. Selectively
appropriated, the notion normalizes and legitimizes the idea of urban competition, which
revolves around the idea that subnational units have no choice but to compete with one
another for economic survival and for transnationally footloose capital investments.62 The
governmental techniques through which such normalization occurs are analysed in the
following section.
Governing through Global City Indexes
In the previous section, I argued that the global city concept has been selectively appropriated
to legitimize and normalize the idea of territorial competition, which rests upon a problematic
analogy of capitalist business companies and subnational territorial units.63 Still, as Peter
Taylor argues, a typical question posed by city representatives to global city experts is how to
succeed in the competitive game, climb up the hierarchy of globality and become a “bona fide
global city”.64 The fact that attaining the status of being a global city has become such a
popular indulgence among urban elites cannot be simply attributed to incompetence and the
intellectual carelessness of its proponents. Rather, specific mechanisms of power normalize
the aspirational appeal of the notion of the global city, and these mechanisms need to  be
analysed. In this section, my focus is on one such mechanism: a set of global cities reports
and indexes.
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The first attempt to create an index of global cities is the report published by the Globalization
and World Cities (GaWC) network at the University of Loughborough in 1998. Since then,
consultants, media outlets, NGOs, international and national state agencies have started to
develop benchmarks, metrics, rankings and indexes that attempt to position cities within a
global frame.65 The number of reports has grown to an extent that it now seems fair to talk
about a “city index industry” which – despite differences in analytical methods – is held
together by the practice of classifying cities.66
The GaWC report notwithstanding, the first issues of today’s most influential reports were
published in the aftermath of the 2007–2008 financial crisis and are now produced in large
numbers by consulting firms, think tanks, chambers of commerce, universities, and the media.
In this article, I focus on the governmental role of a set of influential comprehensive global
city indicators, i.e. A. T. Kearney’s Global Cities Index, Economist Intelligence Unit’s The
2025 Global City Competitiveness Index (or Hot Spots 2025), Mori Memorial Foundation’s
Global Power Cities Index, Price Waterhouse Cooper’s Cities of Opportunity, as well as
Knight Frank’s Wealth Report. The indexes and reports have become a “booming cottage
industry”67 for consulting firms and think tanks. Additionally, the competitive understanding
of the global city that they advance also has had substantial influence in public discourse, as
illustrated by the way in which their results are discussed in the Finnish and Japanese media:
Cities can be roughly divided into three groups on the basis of international
rankings. New York, London and Tokyo are mega class superglobal cities.
Cities and city-states such as San Francisco, Singapore and Dubai are on level
two. On the lowest level, there may sometimes also loom capital cities of the
Nordic states. If we strive really hard, Helsinki, Stockholm and Copenhagen can
be on the third or fourth level of the hierarchy of global cities.68
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Since the first edition of the GPCI in 2008, Tokyo has almost always been in
fourth place after New York, London and Paris. Ichikawa said Tokyo should not
be happy with being No. 4.69
As the idea of the dispositif as a globally circulating mechanism suggests, the rankings are
now a standard part of public discourse in various parts of the world. Their aspirational tone,
often communicated through numbers, is easily picked up, not only by the media but also by
policymakers. In one of its publications, the Moscow city government tells the reader that “on
the dimension of intellectual capital and innovations Moscow is in the 17 th place out of 26,
after Hong Kong, Singapore and Madrid”.70
While this article focuses on the governmental techniques of the rankings and ratings, further
research should explore in more detail the paths through which the reports and their rankings
play in the policymaking processes.71 Doing this would enable moving beyond the state/non-
state or public/private dichotomy in attempts to conceptualize agency in international
relations and world politics, which is something that Harriet Bulkeley and Heike Schroeder
stress in their analysis of global cities and the governance of climate change. 72
In the rest of this section, I elaborate how the global city dispositif functions as a mechanism
of productive power. I focus upon three mechanisms: naming, evaluation and subjectification.
Through my inquiry, I illustrate the role that the reports and indexes have played in turning a
selectively framed understanding of global cities into an image of city success. I show that the
reports are aspirational, normalizing and disciplinary: they highlight features that cities should
exhibit, point out absences that are defined as problematic, and prompt their objects of
evaluation to conform to a preconceived model.
 Assigning Names and Labels
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Naming and labelling is a specific act of power. It brings order to the abundance of
information and orders experiences. According to Dale Spender, naming “is the means
whereby we attempt to order and structure the chaos and flux of existence which would
otherwise be an undifferentiated mass. By assigning names we impose … a meaning which
allows us to manipulate the world”.73 The global city reports and indexes do exactly that, they
place cities in class rankings and identify these ranks with names and codes. For example, the
GaWC report divides the examined cities into three classes – alpha, beta and gamma – and
further into three or four subclasses (e.g. beta+, beta, beta-). The Global Financial Centres
Index classifies the cities as “global”, “transnational” and “local”. Some reports simply place
the cities in a numerical hierarchical order based on an assessment of their “globality”.74
The act of naming enables the reports and indexes to treat global citydom as something that is
quite unproblematically knowable. Naming and labelling bypasses the fact that the discussion
is conducted in metaphorical terms, that the term global city and its derivatives – as used in
the reports – conceals a whole set of controversial assumptions.75 Moreover, the reports rely
on the language of science and use adjectives such as “objective”, “impartial” and “detailed”
to enforce the idea that they have the authority to designate certain cities as global cities.76
The reports are said to be based on extensive research and large data sets making them
transparent and comparable. Yet, they function like a spotlight that sheds light on some
features in the object of evaluation and, as such, conceal other aspects.
Feminist scholars have long recognized that the power of naming goes hand-in-hand with
questions of visibility and invisibility.77 Naming is often put forward as a way to combat
invisibility; however, naming, and its associated techniques of examination, can also be a way
of forcing visibility, which renders it a disciplinary mechanism. In fact, Foucault called
visibility a trap.78 Those who are seen begin to control themselves so as to behave and thus
conform to the will of the system. Similarly, the global city reports – a form of “paper
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panopticon”79 – establish a visibility over cities, a visibility used to differentiate and judge
them.80 In addition, internet tools are available on the report producers’ websites, which
enables the user to make customised comparisons of cities. For example, the consultant
company PwC offers the Model Your City tool, which enables anyone to compare 27 cities
using 60 variables.81 Report and indexes are thus a form of power that does not deploy signs
of sovereignty, but objectifies those on whom it is exercised, by way of creating a body of
knowledge about them.82
The reports try to establish the impression that assigning the status of a global city to certain
cities is the outcome of an objective and transparent process. However, the code names of
global city reports – alphas and betas, rising stars and black holes – are ciphers that mask as
much as they reveal. Examining the indicators behind code names and the weightings behind
hierarchies, one soon learns that they are framed in a specific way. The analyzed global city
reports display a broad variety of indicators. A.T. Kearney index employs 26 indicators in
five categories: human capital, business activity, information exchange, cultural experience,
and political engagement. The Economist Intelligence Unit uses 32 indicators – 27 qualitative
and 5 quantitative – which it groups into eight categories. Mori’s 70 indicators are grouped
into six categories such as economy and R&D, academic muscle, and livability – with little
mention of political engagement. PwC’s 56 indicators in 10 categories cover quite similar
ground while glossing over politics.
Despite certain differences between the rankings, in all of them a city’s ability to score points
depends primarily on its usefulness for finance capital. All the examined comprehensive
rankings treat a well-functioning finance sector as a compulsory element of being a global
city. As its name suggests, the Z/Yen Group’s Global Financial Centres Index makes that its
only criteria and excludes cities that are not recognized financial centres. Other reports also
lean heavily on finance and commerce in their weightings. In the Economist Intelligence
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Unit’s global city report, “economic strength” is weighted 30 percent. Fifteen percent is
assigned both to “institutional effectiveness” and “human capital”. “Physical capital”,
“financial maturity”, and “global appeal” are ten percent each. “Social and cultural character”
– an indicator standing for freedom of expression and human rights, diversity, cultural
vibrancy and crime rates – is only worth five percentage points as is “environmental and
natural hazards”, i.e. the quality of environmental governance and risk of natural disasters.83
While urbanization stands for a variety of spatially grounded economic, demographic,
technological and sociocultural processes, it is framed in quite specific ways in the global city
reports. One of the grounds given for the epochal claim that cities are surpassing states in
importance is a specific aspect of urbanization – that a larger portion of the world’s wealth is
produced in cities than is their share of world population.84 As one of the reports notes, “well
over half of the world’s population lives in cities, generating more than 80% of global GDP.
Standard population projections show that virtually all global growth over the next 30 years
will be in urban areas”.85 The unevenness of urbanization related development is thus
recognized and normalized – not problematized. Moreover, the reports strategically forget to
mention the fact that cities generate not only a major share of the global GDP but also 70% of
greenhouse emissions and 70% of global waste.86
Yet, societal models that do not seem to offer opportunities for profit making are exoticized in
the reports. Sao Paulo’s good results in adult literacy, classroom size and libraries – its
“commitment to enhancing intellectual capital” – is argued to be inconsistent with the fact
that its showings in entrepreneurial environment and the Innovation Cities Index are poor: “It
is difficult to reconcile the city’s first place in university research with its median rank in
protection of intellectual property, let alone with its sixth place in innovation”.87 While it is
possible to highlight a number of different understandings of what it means to be a global city
or to pay attention to various aspects of urbanization, the economism of global city indicators
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enforces the role of businesses in defining globality: “Business leaders must be a driving force
to create a vision for a global city”.88 This example illustrates the fact that the reports seek to
naturalize the assumption that cities are homogeneous actors climbing up the hierarchy of
globality – but that in practice, such ascendance in status often means meeting the needs of
the globally involved and economically prosperous.
Motivating Competition
Incompetence and intellectual sloppiness does not explain the fact that urban elites around the
world try to attain the status of being a global city. Instead, certain governmental and
disciplinary mechanisms motivate city representatives to engage in the competitive game. The
reports present comparisons as an opportunity for the cities to understand their strengths and
weaknesses, and become inspired to renew and develop themselves.89 Constant change is
argued to be a key to success as a global city: “the continuing spirit of planning, building,
breaking and rebuilding remains a keystone of Chicago’s success”.90 Or,
today more than ever, global cities need to run just to stand still. Urban leaders
that wish to provide their citizens with the benefits of becoming a global
powerhouse must fire on all five cylinders (business activity, human capital,
information exchange, cultural experience, and political engagement) all the
time.91
This resonates with Wendy Larner and Richard Le Heron’s argument that the comparing and
benchmarking is a characteristic feature of contemporary economic and social life. Such
“treadmills of incessant learning and feedback” are expected to “encourage places and people
to constantly reinvent themselves and remobilise their efforts, bringing new economic spaces
and subjects into being”.92 As in any attempt to motivate through comparisons, penalties and
rewards are also involved. On the pages of global city reports, specific code function as marks
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of honour and disgrace, as do numerical rankings, or references to “leaders and laggards”.93
An improved position in rankings and league tables may be regarded as a reward as such, and
a fall in rankings as a penalty.94 Hierarchical individuation is one way of motivating
competition, and global city reports also often place their objects of evaluation in hierarchical
arrangements, such as league table rankings. Topographical metaphors – the language of
peaks and valleys – provide another characteristic way for the reports to enforce the idea that
the name and status of the global city is something to strive for:
In this sense, the world is not flat. Instead, it is a landscape of peaks and valleys,
and global cities are the peaks. Often, they soar above the hinterland around
them, having more to do with each other than with their own countrymen in the
valleys below. From their summits, global citizens talk to each other and do the
world’s business.95
Through comparison, hierarchization and gratification, the global city reports thus normalize
the idea that cities are actors that must strive to attain the status of global city – and that this
necessitates engaging in competition with other cities. As one of the reports states,
“competition with other cities, whether for a new factory or new museum, is a fact of life”.96
A characteristic way of enforcing the competitive dynamism is to cultivate the fear of the
hunted. This takes place, for example, by representing the capital cities of the so-called
emerging economies as challengers of the established global cities, as “rising stars” and
“knockers at the door”.97 Or by suggesting that the major cities of India, Brazil and Russia
“are expected to catch up to many cities in the developed world”.98
According to the UN’s World Urbanization Prospects, 66% of the world’s population will be
urban dwellers by 2050.99 Given this, the UN encourages cities to generate better income and
employment opportunities, expand water and sanitation infrastructure, ensure equal access to
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services and reduce the number of people living in slums.100 Urbanization is also one of the
elements of the global city dispositif. Yet, the analysed materials easily raise the image of the
global city as a one-dimensional city: “what is good for any part of the city is good for all
within it, and the part in question is almost always the globally involved or economically
prosperous part”.101 At the policy level, the global city dispositif thus legitimizes interventions
aimed at creating smooth conditions for the circulation of goods, services and capital.102
Skyscrapers illustrate this point well. Communicating economic power and status, the image
of supertall skylines seems to be an inescapable part of any global city. In addition,
“skyscraper construction activity” is also something that a city can get points for.103 Knight
Frank 2015 Global Cities report contains a specific skyscraper index, which rewards cities
not only for the construction rate of skyscrapers, but also for the “capital values on the
premium upper floors”104 of these buildings. As the report emphasizes, skyscrapers are an
indicator of being a global city since they allow the conversion of air into “land”, and thus
into a profit-making opportunity.105
Forms of Subjectivity and Social Relations
There are close linkages between forms of power and processes of subjectification, as
captured in Foucault’s famous definition of government as “conduct of conducts”.106 The
global city apparatus is also productive of specific kinds of subjects and social relations. The
sovereign figure of the reports is the representative of globally footloose capital – an investor
or a representative of a multinational corporation.107 The reports are structured according to
the motivations and needs of these people, people with surplus capital. If we look for an
explanation for why the Economist Intelligence Unit report, for example, weights its
indicators exactly the way it does, we are told that “investors follow sizeable and growing
markets”.108 Investors are characterised as actors only consumed with deciding where to put
their money109 and the reports as a reliable and easily accessible body of information for such
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decision-making. The A.T. Kearney Global Cities Index, for example, claims that it
constitutes a preferred source of information for businesses contemplating where to locate
regional headquarters, expand operations or find the best talent.110
Another noteworthy feature of the analysed global city reports is that the status of a global
city is argued to necessitate a specific kind of population. The reports emphasise “intellectual
capital”, which is defined, for example, in terms of mathematics and science skills, literacy
and the level of education.111 The reports treat global cities as “talent magnets”112 and also
measure which cities actually host such talent: they rate cities according to the size of foreign-
born population, the level of education of the population, international schools, top
universities and international student population.113 State and city governments are tasked to
“lure the men and women who make up the human capital that is the modern urban
economy’s most precious commodity”.114 At the same time, the reports remain silent about
other kinds of identities; efforts to respond to the needs of wider populations do not form part
of their rewarding dynamism.
The components of the public sector – representatives of cities and states – play the role of
objects of evaluation in the reports. Their actions are argued to be decisive in avoiding the
marginalisation and impoverishment of cities and in the pursuit of policies capable of
attracting attention of investors and, ultimately, for their money. The reports rely on and
reproduce the neoliberal script that sees the state and the public sector as a limited but
efficient actor, which creates the conditions for the market mechanism and competition to
function. They encourage the public sector to make investments in infrastructure, speedy
network connections and broadband technology in particular: “high-speed access to
information can make the difference between failure and success”.115 It is through this kind of
competitive dynamism that the global city dispositif scripts cities as competitive actors,
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enforces specific kinds of subjectivities and social relations, and thus fabricates a world that it
claims already exists.
Conclusions
This article has proposed an alternative to the existing International Relations
conceptualizations of global cities. Previous contributions suggest either viewing the global
city as a new type of an actor in international and world politics, a unit of a transforming
international system, or a site through which global assemblages operate. I have argued that
treating global cities as actors is problematic for the reason that it obfuscates the politics – the
clashes of interest – that characterize most urban communities. As for the claim that the
global city is an indicator of a transformation of the international system and that we are thus
living through an important moment of international change, what is often lacking in the
literature is the articulation of how such a transformation is taking place. My argument is that
the global city should be examined as a dispositif of power as this enables the appreciation of
the fact that it also takes part in the fabrication of the world it describes.
This argument was made in two parts. Firstly, a genealogy of the global city showed that the
concept emerged within an academic discussion on the problems of uneven economic
development, but has since been popularized. It also demonstrated that while the concept has
become popularized, it has been selectively appropriated. While the global city was initially a
critical concept, it is now treated as a desirable status to obtain and as an indicator of success.
I argued that this selective appropriation is not a matter of a mistaken identification between
the colloquial and scholarly global city concepts, but rather reflects the strategic character of
the dispositif. It echoes attempts to fit the global city concept into the agendas of territorial
competitiveness, entrepreneurial cities and competition states. Some elements of the neo-
26
Marxist global city scholarship have been retained, while others have been purposefully
forgotten.
Secondly, I detailed some governmental techniques that bestow the global city its aspirational
appeal and prescriptive, world-making capacity. I focused on the techniques of naming and
labelling, motivating competition through hierarchies and enforcing subjectivities and social
relations. This enabled me to show how the global city dispositif fabricates the world. It
normalizes a specific understanding of contemporary urbanization and social relations, and
may also legitimize the materialization of cities into a specific form. The competitive appeal
encourages state and city governments to support the kinds of policies and infrastructure
thought necessary to maintain or improve the city’s standing within the network of global
cities, but that in practice usually benefit the globally involved and economically prosperous.
Thus, the voyage of the global city concept from critical geography to a consultant buzzword
is not to be written off as an outcome of intellectual carelessness. Rather, the coordinates for
the travel are provided by the key characteristics of a dispositif: its emergence through the
actions of a multitude of agents, capacity for decontextualization and recontextualization,
resonance with the strategic needs of an epoch, and governmental capacity. This also
highlights that the rise of global cities is not inevitable. It presents one available model for
making sense of the contemporary processes of urbanization.
A dispositif is a mechanism of power, but there are cracks and fractures in it. Due to this, it
can be (re)directed towards alternative projects, towards different ways of fabricating the
world. Arguably, conceptualizing the global city as a dispositif also enables the identification
of a range of alternative imaginaries. Articulations of such projects are available. They can be
found, for example, in attempts to foreground such sociocultural and socio-political
dimensions that mainstream analyses, city elites and armies of consultants tend to ignore.
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These would include radical grassroots movements, gendered spaces, informal networks of
immigrant “others”, footprints and memories, a city’s world of sounds…116 Efforts to
reimagine the emerging urban world order may also draw inspiration from the (Lefebvrian)
idea of the “right to the global city”,117 which already shapes the way in which urbanization is
framed, for example, in the United Nation’s New Urban Agenda.118 A different understanding
is also present in analyses that show how “ordinary cities” are complexly embedded in global-
relational contexts.119 These examples remind us that while an engagement of International
Relations scholars with the dynamics of urbanization though the global city concept is
certainly welcome, the concept has to be treated critically and the search for alternative
formulations of the role of cities and urbanization in world politics should continue.
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